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APPELLANTS1 REPLY TO HORIUCHTS AND OVERSOWS 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs have no objection to oral argument, although they disagree with 
the Commissioners1 mischaracterization of the nature and issues of this appeal. 
The issues before this Court are not "important issues of appellate jurisdiction ... 
and absolute legislative immunity. "1 The issues of this appeal involve questions 
of law regarding the illegal vacation of North Union Avenue, which was the sole 
access to plaintiffs' property, and questions of law involving judicial procedure. 
These issues were fidly articulated in plaintiffs'/appellants1 brief on appeal, and 
were almost totally ignored by the Board of County Commissioners and Overson 
and Horiuchi in their reply briefs.2 
As to the issue of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over 
this appeal as per the February 28, 1996 order of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Plaintiffs filed their appeal in a timely fashion, immediately following the trial 
court's entering of the "final" order in this case.3 This issue will be more fully 
argued (again, for the fourth time) below. 
APPELLANTS1 REPLY TO DEFENDANTS1 
STATEMENTS OF THE CASE 
The Board of County Commissioners1, and Horiuchi's and Overson's 
Statements of the Case contain numerous misrepresentations of the record, out-of-
context statements, and non-factual argument. However, rather that consume the 
Plaintiffs might characterize this as "putting on airs." 
2Plaintiffs also take exception to the Commissioners' unprofessional and insulting language. A phrase 
such as "vexatious and groundless appeal" is, in itself, vexatious and groundless, and serves no useful 
function in a legal brief. However, this type of language does tend to highlight Horiuchi's and Overson's 
malicious attitude toward the plaintiffs. 
3Plaintiffs thought this was the final order. However, the County and the Commissioners then filed a 
Motion to Consolidate in this case at the end of September, 1995, more than five months after the date 
upon which they now claim the case was dismissed. This issue will also be articulated more fully in this 
brief. 
Court's time with a point-by-point refutation, plaintiffs will simply reassert that the 
record speaks for itself, and that plaintiffs stand by their presentation of the facts. 
[Plaintiffs would note, however, if actual questions of fact exist, as defendants 
seem to imply, then perhaps the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.] 
To the extent any of those factual disagreements appear relevant in the reply 
argument, plaintiffs will explain the apparent discrepancy. 
ARGUMENT 
As stated above, the Board of County Commissioners and Commissioners 
Overson and Horiuchi have chosen to ignore the issues of this appeal. In doing 
this, they have failed to dispute any of the dispositive issues of fact or law 
presented by the plaintiffs in their brief. 
They don't dispute that, after the hearing on May 25, 1994, plaintiffs' 
received no notification of any kind, written or oral, from the County concerning 
any of the subsequent meetings or any of the actions ultimately taken by the 
Commission regarding the vacation of North Union Avenue. 
They don't dispute, or even explain, their own testimony that the decision to 
vacate North Union Avenue was not "made" or "rendered" until they adopted 
Ordinance No. 1275 in August, 1994, more than three months after the May 25th 
public hearing, in clear violation of the 30-day time limitation set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. §17-27-810 (1) (a). 
They don't dispute, or even explain, their own testimony that they turned 
over the public right-of-way to Hermes before properly and legally vacating that 
right-of-way as outlined in Utah Code Ann. §17-27-810, thereby effecting the 
vacation decision prior to the time they claim to have "made" or "rendered" the 
decision. Nor do they dispute that this action nullifies the entire vacation process. 
2 
They don't dispute, or even explain, their own testimony that they attempted 
to "render" the road vacation, after the fact, more than 30 days after the public 
hearing, thereby nullifying the vacation decision. 
They don't dispute the legal conclusion that, because they failed to follow 
the proscribed procedures, the "purported vacation of the Roadway is a nullity." 
Nelson v.Provo City, 872 P.2d 35, 38 (Utah App. 1994) 
In an apparent attempt, then, to divert this Court from the actual issues at 
bar, the Board of County Commissioners, and Overson and Horiuchi have created 
a smoke screen of extraneous issues involving mischaracterizations of the facts 
and misapprehensions of the law of this case and even of the standard of review 
for their own issues. Again, rather that try to match the defendants point-by-point, 
plaintiffs will attempt to return this appeal to the real issues. 
POINT I - THE f'VALIDITY1 f OF THE VACATION 
ORDINANCE(S) IS NOT NOW, NOR HAS IT EVER BEEN, 
A PROPER LEGAL ISSUE IN THIS CASE. PLAINTIFFS 
TIMELY CHALLENGED THE ILLEGALITY OF THE 
VACATION DECISION AS OUTLINED IN 
UTAH CODE ANN. §17-27-810 
The law governing the vacation of public roads is very specific: 
17-27-810 Grounds for vacating or changing a plat. 
(1) (a) Within 30 days after the public hearing required by 
this part, the responsible body or officer shall consider the petition. 
(b) If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that 
neither the public nor any person will be materially injured by the 
proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment, and that there is good 
cause for the vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative 
body, by ordinance, may vacate, alter, or amend the plat, any portion 
of the plat, or any street or lot. 
(c) The responsible body or officer may approve the 
vacation, alteration, or amendment by ordinance, amended plat, 
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administrative order, or deed containing a stamp or mark indicating 
approval by the responsible body or officer. 
(d) The responsible body or officer shall ensure that the 
vacation, alteration, or amendment is recorded in the office of the 
county recorder in which the land is located. 
(2) An aggrieved party may appeal the responsible body's or 
officer's decision to district court as provided in Section 17-27-1001. 
(Emphasis added.) 
With only a cursory reading of this law we can see that the body vacating a 
road [in this case, the County Commission] may do so by approving an ordinance, 
or they may choose one of several other methods. Note, on the other hand, that the 
action of recording the decision is required — "the responsible body shall insure..." 
The choice to codify the vacation decision as an ordinance is optional, not 
mandatory. Likewise, an aggrieved party [in this case, the plaintiffs] may, if they 
so choose, appeal the Commission's decision, not the validity of the vacation 
ordinance, to the district court "as provided in Section 17-27-1001." 
17-27-1001 Appeals 
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the 
exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the 
local decision is rendered. 
(3) The courts shall: [again, there's no option here] 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are 
valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal (Emphasis added.) 
Within 30 days after the defendants blocked off and then handed over the 
public right-of-way that had been North Union Avenue to Hermes to destroy, 
plaintiffs filed their Complaint and then their Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs most 
assuredly did not, as alleged by defendants, challenge "the validity of the vacation 
ordinance." First, the law specifically prohibits challenging the validity of the land 
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use decision. Second, there was no ordinance to challenge. The defendants 
moved ahead with the vacation of the road without the benefit of an ordinance, 
and, in fact, did not adopt an ordinance for another seven weeks. That ordinance 
was adopted at a meeting of the County Commissioners which was held without 
any notice, written or oral, before or after, to plaintiffs. 
Again, the vacation decision reflected in this vacation ordinance was not the 
decision voted on by the Commissioners at the May 25th hearing. The May 25th 
hearing left a strip of North Union Avenue with no connection to any other public 
road. The vacation ordinance, on the other hand, left a strip of North Union 
Avenue with no connection to any other public road except a 25-foot right-of-way 
that did not meet County code, and which was adopted without notice and without 
plaintiffs having any opportunity to comment on the decision.4 
POINT H - IN THE NELSON CASE, THE COURT OF 
APPEALS MAKES NO MENTION OF THE "VALIDITY OF 
THE VACATION ORDINANCE.'1 RATHER, IN RULING 
UPON THE "RESPONSIBLE BODYfS" FAILURE TO 
FOLLOW THE VACATION PROCEDURE, THIS COURT 
RULED "THE PURPORTED VACATION... IS A NULLITY." 
In ruling that the City had failed to follow the procedure for vacating a 
public street, the Court of Appeals makes no mention of "the vacation ordinance," 
nor does this Court rule that the conclusion of an unsuccessful or illegal road 
vacation is an "invalid vacation ordinance." Rather, this Court rules that failure to 
follow the vacation procedure "nullifies" the road vacation. The ordinance itself is 
nothing more than the embodiment of the decision, and should not be viewed as an 
end in and of itself, but merely as the means to an end [the "end" being the 
successful and legal completion of the road vacation process.] The "validity" of 
4Ultimately, the Commissioners refused to defend even this right-of-way / public road when Hermes 
decided to build on it. Apparently, Hermes decided they needed the additional space, and they cut out 
about five feet of this already-inadequate street. 
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the vacation ordinance depends solely on the actions of the defendants. If the 
decision is illegal, and/or the vacation process is a nullity, then the vacation 
ordinance, a reflection of the decision and the process, could be deemed invalid. 
But it is the decision and/or the process which is being challenged, not the validity 
of the optional vacation ordinance. 
POINT m -- THE "ADMISSIONS'1 OF PLAINTIFFS1 
COUNSEL REGARDING THE "VALIDITY OF THE 
VACATION ORDINANCE" DO NOT CONSTITUTE 
"WAIVER." RATHER, THOSE ADMISSIONS ARE 
MERELY A REFLECTION OF THE LAW. 
Again, the defendants try to make a great deal of hay out of plaintiffs' 
counsel's "admissions'1 that plaintiffs weren't "challenging the validity of the 
vacation ordinance," but those admissions, for all the reasons set forth herein, do 
not constitute any type of waiver. On the contrary, plaintiffs have never 
"attacked" the validity of the road vacation ordinance, and have always "admitted" 
that fact. (RoA at 840.) 
If defendants chose suddenly to "rely" on those statements in setting forth 
or failing to set forth their issues, then they did so in full and glorious disregard of 
the law and the facts of this case. Plaintiffs have always contended, and will 
always assert, that the decision to vacate North Union Avenue was illegal both in 
its effect upon plaintiffs' property and in the notice and process that led to that 
decision, and defendants had every opportunity to "rely" on that claim. 
POINT IV - THE CONVERSATION OF JANUARY 30,1995, 
REGARDING THE "VALIDITY OF THE VACATION 
ORDINANCE," ENGAGED IN BETWEEN AND AMONG 
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE, AND PLAINTIFFS' AND 
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DEFENDANTS1 ATTORNEYS, AND REFERRED TO 
COPIOUSLY IN THE DEFENDANTS' BRIEFS, 
HAD NO LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE. NOR DOES THE 
"DEMEANOR" OF ANY OF THE PARTICIPANTS FIGURE 
INTO THE ADJUDICATION OF ANY ISSUE OF LAW. 
On January 30, 1995, the trial court, in considering plaintiffs1 motion to 
amend their complaint, accepted the Commissioners statement that, unbeknownst 
to plaintiffs, they had not made the decision to vacate North Union Avenue, until 
they adopted, without notice to plaintiffs, a corrected vacation ordinance, more 
than three months after the public hearing required by the law, and more than 60 
days after their allowable time expired. 
However, instead of recognizing this statement as an admission that the 
Commissioners had illegally vacated North Union Avenue, the trial court then 
began asking plaintiffs1 counsel a series of questions regarding plaintiffs' intentions 
as to the validity of the vacation ordinance, questions which plaintiffs have since 
established had no legal significance in plaintiffs' challenge to the legality of the 
vacation decision. 
Nevertheless, the Commissioners, in their brief, would have this Court 
believe that, in making a ruling on these issues of law, the Court should defer to 
the Commissioners1 best guess as to what might have been the trial court's unstated 
observation of plaintiffs' counsel's "appearance," "demeanor," or tone of voice 
during this discussion.5 Of course, were the trial court or the Appeals Court to 
allow something as subjective as "appearance" or "nuance" to help them determine 
an issue of law, that would constitute a mighty "abuse of discretion," indeed. 
5
 This plaintiff, unlike defendants1 attorneys, was present at the January 30,1995, and can testify that the 
"demeanor" of plaintiffs' counsel during the course of the trial court judge's questioning, was one of 
stunned confusion regarding the strange and meaningless nature of the trial court's questions concerning 
the validity of the vacation ordinance. The trial court should have been asking defendants why they chose 
to illegally vacate North Union Avenue, instead of asking plaintiffs whether they intended to incorrectly 
and ineffectively challenge the road vacation ordinance. The trial court was already on notice that 
plaintiffs were alleging the illegality of the vacation decision, as that had been the issue before the court 
for more than seven months. 
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POINT V - AT THE END OF THE JANUARY 30,1995 
HEARING ON THE MOTION TO AMEND, THE TRIAL 
COURT JUDGE MADE NO BENCH RULING OR BENCH 
ORDER PROHIBITING PLAINTIFFS FROM 
CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF THE VACATION 
ORDINANCES NOR DID HE PROHIBIT PLAINTIFFS 
FROM AMENDING THE COMPLAINT TO 
INCLUDE THE ISSUES OF DAMAGES 
The trial court did not issue an "order from the bench prohibiting Plaintiffs 
from amending the complaint to add damage claims...," nor did the trial court 
judge dismiss plaintiffs' claims regarding the illegality of the vacation decision, as 
defendants would have this Court believe. As plaintiffs have repeatedly explained, 
none of their complaints attacked the validity of the vacation ordinance. (RoA at. 
840.) Consequently, defendants1 attempts to preclude "assaults" on the validity of 
the vacation ordinance were meaningless. The trial court said nothing about 
plaintiffs1 claims regarding the illegality of the vacation decision, which was the 
basis of all three of plaintiffs' complaints. 
The trial court agreed to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint just 
as they had submitted it, including retaining their challenges to the legality of the 
vacation decision and their requests for damages. (RoA at 845.) The trial court 
then signed an order effecting that ruling, an order which contains no restrictions 
as to what plaintiffs could or could not allege. (RoA at 294-295.) 
Talk from the bench is no more binding than an unsigned minute entry, and 
the trial court's "ruling" had no legal or jurisdictional meaning without an order 
effecting that "ruling." After the talk stopped, the trial court judge apparently 
backed off his threats to rule on issues which were not properly before the court, 
or to rule on motions which had not been properly briefed. Instead, the trial court 
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judge signed the order allowing plaintiffs to file their complaint exactly as they 
had submitted. The order itself is the bottom line, not the discussion of that order.6 
Because the trial court granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend to include 
claims for both compensatory and punitive damages, there was no reason for 
Plaintiffs to appeal that order. None of the defendants chose to appeal the trial 
court's order on this issue, even though the court allowed plaintiffs to seek 
damages and to continue to pursue their claims regarding the illegality of the 
vacation decision. 
POINT VI - THE VACATION DECISION, AND 
SUBSEQUENT ORDINANCES, CONTAINED ROAD 
VACATION DECISIONS WHICH PLAINTIFFS 
DID NOT WISH TO CHALLENGE. 
Among the myriad of reasons why plaintiffs have not sought to overturn the 
entire vacation decision (as embodied by the vacation ordinance) is that the 
decision renders some actions which are not being challenged by plaintiffs. For 
instance, the vacation decision dealt with rights-of-way other than North Union 
Avenue, and plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the vacation of those 
rights of way. 
Also, the Commissioners established a 25-foot public road to the west of 
plaintiffs1 property. Although the plaintiffs are in yet-another-legal-battle to bring 
that road up to minimum county standards, plaintiffs have never sought to have 
that decision declared illegal. In fact, some of the damage claims plaintiffs have 
asserted against the individual Commissioners as part of this lawsuit arose from 
6Plaintiffs note, with some irony, that this is exactly what happened regarding the order dismissing 
plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, which is the subject of this suit The trial court dismissed all 
plaintiffs1 claims without prejudice, and entered an unsigned minute entry ruling that all claims were 
dismissed without prejudice. However, the judge then signed an order which said, in part, exactly the 
opposite of what he had ruled - that certain of plaintiffs1 claims would be dismissed with prejudice. 
Moral - "It dont mean nothin' till you sign on the dotted line." 
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the Commissioners refusal to enforce this pubhc right-of-way, by allowing Hermes 
to cut into and then build on top of this public roadway. 
POINT VH - PLAINTIFFS HAVE NEVER ATTEMPTED TO 
FILE CLAIMS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL 
COMMISSIONERS, HORIUCHI AND OVERSON, 
REGARDING THEIR "LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS/1 
THE CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE 
COMMISSIONERS AROSE FROM THEIR MALICIOUS 
REFUSAL TO ENFORCE THE LAW AND TO PROVIDE 
PLAINTIFFS WITH EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
For all their high falutin' talk about being a protected legislative body, the 
County Commission is nothing but a government agency that is not burdened by 
separation of powers or any of the other safeguards designed by the Founding 
Fathers and outlined in the United States and Utah State Constitutions. They are 
not an "absolute" legislative body, and so their immunity is not absolute. The 
Commission is a mere Board, an agency whose powers are derived from and 
defined by the statute that created them. 
While the Commissioners proudly tout that they possess legislative, 
executive and judicial powers, and are protected in their indiscriminate wielding of 
these powers, the closer truth is not quite so glamorous. In fact, and in law, the 
Commissioners have powers which appear to be legislative, executive or judicial 
in nature, but which are actually defined as being either discretionary or non-
discretionary. Simply stated, they are mostly immune in their performance of 
their discretionary functions, but they are liable for damages if they fail to perform 
their non-discretionary functions. 
A quick rundown of the Commissioners discretionary and non-discretionary 
functions involved in this lawsuit might go as follows: 
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1. The process involved in the vacation of a public road is mostly non-
discretionary; 
2. The decision to vacate a road is mostly discretionary; 
3. Setting roadway standards is discretionary; 
4. Enforcing the roadway standards in non-discretionary; 
5. Adopting an ordinance is discretionary; and, 
6. Enforcing that ordinance is non-discretionary. 
Plaintiffs have never attempted, contrary to Overson's and Horiuchfs 
bloated rhetoric, to file claims against the Commissioners for "any Speech or 
Debate," or any other protected function.7 
Plaintiffs1 claims for damages against Horiuchi and Overson involved their 
willful and malicious refusal to enforce the laws of this coimty when those laws 
inconvenienced Hermes or themselves, their willful and malicious refusal to 
provide plaintiffs with equal protection of the law, and their willful and malicious 
attempts to deprive plaintiffs of basic civil rights and property rights. 
None of these actions constitute "legislative functions," nor are they 
"absolutely immune" from damage claims. Furthermore, damage claims are 
factual, and not subject to summary judgment. The trial court never ruled that 
plaintiffs couldn't sue the Commissioners. Consequently, there is no ruling on this 
issue for this Court to affirm.8 
7Plaintiff Meibos notes here that, ironically, both Overson and Horiuchi, as well as the Salt Lake County 
Director of Public Works and the Director of Development Services, have threatened to sue Meibos and 
several others for criticizing their public record. 
8Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Commissioners1 Brief is their paranoid, arrogant, and insulting 
claims that plaintiffs are duplicitous, that plaintiffs are attempting to maintain a groundless appeal "at all 
costs/' and that plaintiffs' appeal is "frivolous and interposed solely to harass..." At least to this plaintiff, 
such statements represent the lowest form of common incivility, These plaintiffs attended a hearing on 
this redevelopment project before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in which three of the justices 
openly chastised the County for their abuses of power, and encouraged the plaintiffs to sue both the 
County and Hermes over the vacation of this road and their failure to abide by their zoning laws. One can 
only wonder what kind of public servant would think that plaintiffs have no right to attempt to protect 
their home and property from governmental intrusion and destruction, would characterize this legally-
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Again, this entire line of argument is meaningless except as a transparent 
way to gouge the county taxpayers and to verbally harass the plaintiffs. These 
plaintiffs have no outstanding damage claims against the Commissioners in any 
court, hence this issue is not ripe for adjudication. 
POINT V m - PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS 
FILED TIMELY, AND IN GOOD FAITH, AFTER THE 
TRIAL COURT HAD SIGNED THE ORDER DISMISSING 
THE POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
Without wishing to rehash old ground, there are a few key dates from this 
case that should be reviewed for a proper consideration of this 
On March 29, 1995, the trial court, without ruling on any of plaintiffs1 
claims, ruled from the bench that plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint should be 
dismissed without prejudice, and instructed Salt Lake County's and Hermes1 
attorney, Nick Colessides, to prepare the order effecting that ruling. (RoA at 922-
923) 
Also on March 29, the trial court entered a Minute Entry stating that 
plaintiffs1 complaint was dismissed without prejudice. (RoA at 637) 
On April 6, 1995, the Commissioners submitted an order dismissing with 
prejudice all claims regarding the road vacation ordinance, and dismissing without 
prejudice all other claims. 
On April 10, 1995, plaintiffs filed an Objection to this order and a Request 
for Hearing, challenging the language contained in the order. (RoA at 639-643) 
On April 14, 1995, without notifying plaintiffs, the trial court signed the 
order. (RoA at 647-649) 
protected action as "frivolous," and would view as "harassment" plaintiffs' efforts to seek a redress of their 
grievances through the proper legal channels. 
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On April 21, 1995, plaintiffs filed a Notice to Submit their objection 
for decision by the trial court. (RoA at 650-651) 
On May 15, 1995, plaintiffs prepared a Notice of Appeal, which they took 
to the trial court. Plaintiffs discussed with the clerk of the court the Notice and the 
pending objection to the content of the order. This clerk held a telephonic 
conference with the clerk of Supreme Court to decide if plaintiffs1 Notice of 
Appeal should be filed at this time. Plaintiffs and the clerk were told that the 
Notice should be filed after the trial court had dealt with the Objection. (RoA at 
856) 
On May 18, 1995, by way of unsigned Minute entry, the trial court denied 
plaintiffs1 objection and request for hearing, clarifying that the April 14th order 
had accurately reflected the trial court wishes regarding plaintiffs' claims. The 
trial court instructed the County Commission to prepare the order effecting that 
ruling. (RoA at 652-653) The Commission did not prepare the order. 
Plaintiffs called the trial court numerous times over the next few weeks to 
see if an order had been signed and entered, but there was no order. (RoA at 856) 
On July 10, 1995, plaintiffs contacted the Commissioners' attorney 
regarding this order, and the attorney said he did not intend to submit an order. 
(RoA at 856) 
On July 11, 1995, plaintiffs pro se submitted a Motion to Submit Order and 
a proposed order for the trial court to sign which would effect the ruling of the trial 
court's May 18, 1995 minute entry. (RoA at 656-658) 
The Commission objected to plaintiffs motion and order (RoA at 667-675), 
and on August 2, 1995, the trial court set a hearing date for this issue to be heard. 
(RoA at 676-677) 
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On or about August 30, 1995, the trial court heard this issue and ruled that 
the Commission was to submit an order as per the court's previous instructions. 
(RoA at 678) 
Thereafter, defendants1 counsel prepared and submitted an order, which the 
trial court eventually signed on September 26, 1995. (RoA at 701-702) 
On September 25, 1995, the Board of County Commissioners and Overson 
and Horiuchi filed a Motion to Consolidate this case with a case pending before 
the Third District Court. The defendants backdated this Motion and Certificate of 
Service to show a date of August 25, 1995. (RoA at 681-700) 
On September 27, 1995, prior to receiving defendants1 Motion to 
Consolidate, plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal with the trial court. (RoA at 
706-706) 
On October 18, 1995, plaintiffs filed their Docketing Statement. 
On October 24, 1995, while defendants' Motion to Consolidate the issues of 
another more recent action with the issues "pending" in this case was awaiting 
hearing in the trial court, defendants filed their first Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs' 
appeal. The defendants claim in this motion, ironically enough, was that plaintiffs 
had filed their Notice of Appeal too late - that all pending issues in this action had 
been dismissed on April 14, 1995. 
On December 20, 1995, more than eight months after the trial court signed 
the April 14th order, the trial court, Judge Glenn Iwasaki presiding, held a hearing 
to consider defendants' Motion to Consolidate. At that hearing plaintiffs requested 
Rule 11 sanctions against defendants for filing a Motion to Consolidate after all 
issues in this case had been disposed of and for falsifying their Certificate of 
Service. Defendants' counsel testified that they had filed their Motion to 
Consolidate in good faith, believing that appealable issues were still pending 
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before the trial court in this action.9 The trial court affirmed that defendants were 
acting in good faith when they filed the Motion to Consolidate, and refused to 
sanction defendants. (RoA at 753-737) 
Obviously, there's a problem here with the consistency of defendants' 
argument. They claim on the one hand that all questions of law and fact in this 
case were disposed of on April 14, 1995, while arguing out of the other side of 
their collective mouth10 that there were still questions of law and fact pending in 
this case as of December 20, 1995. Are we entitled to "rely" on their allegations? 
Plaintiffs could enter a great deal of argument here, but the facts and the 
law are really quite simple. Plaintiffs' Objection and the attendant pleading tolled 
the thirty-day time period because its ultimate resolution spoke to the substance of 
the appeal. This Court has ruled, "If an amendment or modification does not 
change the substance or character of a judgment, it does not enlarge the time for an 
appeal." Nielson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The logical 
conclusion to this ruling is that if the amendment or modification sought does 
change the substance or character of a judgment, then it must enlarge the time for 
an appeal. 
The Objection acted as a U.R.C.P. Rule 52(b) or Rule 59 post-judgment 
motion, and it was necessary to dispose of the motion by signed order before an 
appeal could be taken. The fact that it was not strictly identified as a Rule 52(b) or 
Rule 59 motion does not take away from its tolling effect: 
Filing of an "exception to order and motion for 
reconsideration" of summary judgment tolled the thirty-day time 
^ule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before 
the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order 
all the actions consolidated... 
10Naturally, plaintiffs recognize that one should never mix metaphors, but this one felt so good. Our 
apologies to this Court for the literary faux pas. 
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period within which to file a notice of appeal, notwithstanding the 
incorrect title placed upon the pleading, since the judge ruled on the 
motion as if it were a motion for a new trial. Watkiss & Campbell v. 
Foa&SoiL 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991) 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal prepared in May was premature, and plaintiffs, 
had they filed that notice, would have been required to file another notice after the 
dismissal, by signed order, of their Objection. 
A notice of appeal filed after a ruling on a motion to alter or 
amend a judgment has been announced, but before the entry of an 
order disposing of the motion, is premature and does not confer 
jurisdiction on the court. Anderson v. SchwendimaiL 764 P.2d 999 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
Plaintiffs were advised to wait to file their Notice of Appeal until they had a 
signed order disposing of plaintiffs1 objections in some way, which turned out to 
be sound advice. 
An unsigned minute entry is not a final judgment for purposes 
of appeal. A judgment, tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, 
starts to run on the date when the trial court enters its first signed 
order denying the motion. Gallardo v. Bollander. 800 P.2d 816 
(Utah 1990) 
Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal in good faith as soon as they were 
able to obtain a written order disposing of their Objection. The long waiting 
period was caused by the defendants, who refused to prepare the dispositive 
although they had been specifically instructed to do so. (Maybe their ulterior 
motive was to challenge the timeliness of plaintiffs' appeal.) Additionally, even 
after the trial court had entered the dispositive order, defendants continued to 
assert that there were still questions of law or fact pending before the trial court in 
this case.11 
1
 Plaintiffs truly believe that somewhere along the line, they should be entitled to Rule 11 sanctions 
regarding some of these actions. 
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CONCLUSION 
The issues of law raised by plaintiffs in the appellant brief have not been 
answered by the defendants. Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court for a ruling 
as to when, as a matter of law, the decision to vacate North Union was made and 
rendered. Such a determination must be a matter of law, and not a matter of fact. 
Otherwise, parties aggrieved by illegal vacations of their public easement and 
access would be unable to determine exactly when it is appropriate and timely to 
challenge the vacation decision in district court, and other property owners might 
be subjected to exactly the same type of political gamesmanship and abuse of 
power of the type that has characterized all of the Commissioners' dealings with 
these plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs also request the Court to deny defendants' various motions to 
dismiss plaintiffs1 Notice of Appeal, on the grounds that plaintiffs filed in a timely 
fashion, and that any delay in the filing of the Notice of Appeal was caused by 
defendants' bad faith attempts to interfere with the judicial process. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of March, 1997. 
UL^'l 
)iane Pearl Meibos 
Plaintiff/Attorney pro se 
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